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This work shows a possible application of quantum game theory to the area of quantum infor-
mation, in particular to quantum cryptography. Here, we proposed two quantum key-distribution
(QKD) protocols based on the quantum version of the Monty Hall game devised by Flitney and
Abbott in [31]. Unlike most QKD protocols, in which the bits from which the key is going to be
extracted are encoded in a basis choice (as in BB84), we encode these in an operation choice. The
first proposed protocol uses qutrits to describe the state of the system and the same game-operators
as in [31]. The motivation behind the second proposal was to simplify a possible physical implemen-
tation by adapting the formalism of the qutrit protocol to use qubits and simple logical quantum
gates. In both protocols the security relies on the violation of a Bell-type inequality, for two qutrits
and for six qubits in each case. Results show a higher ratio of violation than the E91 protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1926, Vernam invented the one-time pad encryption
[1], which uses a random secret key shared between two
parties to encrypt a message. More than two decades
later, in 1949, Shannon proved that the one-time pad
scheme is optimal [2], provided that the key is not reused
by the parties. Therefore, in order to implement this
scheme, the communicating parties must have a secure
method to generate and share a random key that is as
long as the message to be encrypted.
Consequently, one of the main goals of quantum cryp-
tography nowadays, is to build a methodology that allows
two parties to share a secure random key by taking ad-
vantage of the properties of quantum systems. To date,
a variety of quantum key-distribution (QKD) protocols
have been proposed for this task [3–10].
Of particular relevance are the protocols developed by
Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984 (BB84) [3],
and by Artur Ekert in 1991 (E91) [4], as they were the
first proposals and each one of them uses a different prop-
erty of quantum systems to securely accomplish the key
distribution. While the security of the BB84 protocol
relies on the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, the se-
curity of the E91 protocol is grounded in the non-classical
correlations that arise between quantum entangled sys-
tems, which are usually tested using Bell-type inequali-
ties [11–17].
On the other hand, the area of mathematics known as
game theory, found one of its main applications in secure
classical communications [18–20], as eavesdropping can
be treated as a game in which the spy’s goal is to extract
the maximum amount of information from a communica-
tion channel. This motivated quantum information theo-
rists to begin including elements of quantum theory such
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as superposition of classical states and quantum entan-
glement into classical game theory [21–26], creating what
is now known as quantum game theory.
One of the games that caught the attention of quan-
tum theorists was the so-called Monty Hall game, which
with its counter-intuitive result, led to a great debate
between some mathematicians and probability experts
in the 1970s and 1990s [27–29]. To date, due to the fact
that the quantization procedure of a classical game is an
entirely subjective task, there are various quantization
schemes of the Monty Hall game [30–35]. The most rel-
evant scheme for the purposes of this paper is the one
developed by Flitney and Abbott [31].
In this work we develop a QKD protocol using qutrits,
and based on Flitney and Abbott’s quantization scheme
of the Monty Hall game. Unlike most QKD protocols, in
which the bits from which the key is going to be extracted
are encoded in a basis choice (as in BB84), we encode
these in an operation choice. The security of our pro-
tocol relies on the violation of a Bell-type inequality for
two qutrits. Furthermore, in order to simplify a possible
physical implementation, we also construct an analogue
protocol using qubits and simple quantum gates, making
it feasible to run on nowadays’ quantum machines. In
this case the security of the protocol relies on the viola-
tion of a Bell-type inequality for six qubits.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief sum-
mary of the classical Monty Hall game in Sec. II, we give
an outline of the quantization scheme of the Monty Hall
game devised by Flitney and Abbott in Sec. III. Sec. IV
corresponds to the proposed protocol using qutrits and
has three subsections: Subsec. IV A, where the protocol
is described, Subsec. IV B, where the security of the pro-
tocol is grounded, and Subsec. IV C, where the possible
vulnerabilities of the protocol are addressed. Sec. V cor-
responds to the proposed protocol using qubits and has
three analogous subsections: Subsec. V A, Subsec. V B
and Subsec. V C.
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2II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CLASSICAL
MONTY HALL GAME
The Monty Hall game is a famous, seemingly paradox-
ical problem in probability [27–29]. It describes a contest
in which a player is asked to choose between three doors,
behind one of which a prize was randomly placed before-
hand. There are two main characters in this contest: the
host (Monty Hall), who knows behind which door the
prize is, and the player, who does not have any informa-
tion about its location.
The contest begins with the player choosing (but not
opening) one of the doors. If the chosen door is the one
with the prize behind, the host, who knows where the
prize hides, randomly opens one of the two empty doors.
On the other hand, if the player chooses one of the empty
doors, the host opens the other remaining empty door.
In both cases the host shares this information with the
player. Lastly, the host asks the player if he wants to
open his initial choice or prefers to open the other door
that remains closed. The apparent paradox results from
the fact that, when doing the calculations, it is found that
the probability of the player finding the prize behind the
door he initially chose is 1/3, while the probability of
finding the prize if he decides to open the other door is
2/3.
III. FLITNEY AND ABBOTT’S
QUANTIZATION SCHEME OF THE MONTY
HALL GAME [31]
In their article [31], Flitney and Abbott use the clas-
sical characters of quantum information: “Alice” as the
Host and “Bob” as the player. A state of the Monty Hall
game is then represented as
|ψ〉 = |o b a〉 , (1)
where a ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the door behind which Alice initially
hid the prize, b ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the door chosen (not opened)
by Bob and o ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the empty door to be opened.
The initial state of the game is labeled as |ψi〉 and the
final state |ψf 〉 is calculated as
|ψf 〉 =
(
cos γ Sˆ + sin γ Iˆ27
)
Oˆ
(
Iˆ3 ⊗ Bˆ ⊗ Aˆ
)
|ψi〉 , (2)
where Aˆ is Alice’s strategy and determines the state of
the hidden prize. Bˆ is Bob’s strategy or choice-of-door
operator. Oˆ is the empty-door-opening operator and se-
lects a door to be opened depending on the value of a and
b. Sˆ is the door-switching operator and selects a different
door depending on the values of b and o. Iˆn is the iden-
tity operator of dimension n and γ ∈ {0, pi2} depending
on Bob’s willingness to apply the switching operator. It
is worth mentioning that Aˆ, Bˆ, Oˆ and Sˆ are all special
unitary operators.
The empty-door-opening operator is defined as
Oˆ =
∑
ijk`
|ijk| |njk〉 〈`jk|+
∑
j`
|mjj〉 〈`jj| , (3)
where ijk is the Levi-Civita symbol, m = (j + ` + 1)
(mod 3) and n = (i+ `) (mod 3).
The door-switching operator is defined as
Sˆ =
∑
ijk`
|ij`| |i`k〉 〈ijk|+
∑
ij
|iij〉 〈iij| , (4)
where, as mentioned by Flitney and Abbott, the second
term is just added to ensure the unitarity of the operator,
as it maps states in which the opened door is the same
as Bob’s chosen one, i.e. o = b, something that does not
happen in the game (Oˆ is explicitly constructed to avoid
that case). Notice that both Oˆ and Sˆ map every basis
state |i j k〉 to a unique basis state.
Under this quantization scheme, the probability of Bob
winning the prize is given by
〈$B〉 =
∑
ij
|〈ijj|ψf 〉|2 , (5)
and one can recover the classical result by choosing, for
example
|ψi〉 = |0 0 0〉 , (6)
Aˆ = Bˆ =

1√
3
0
√
2
3
1√
3
−1√
2
−1√
6
1√
3
1√
2
−1√
6

. (7)
IV. QKD PROTOCOL USING QUTRITS
A. Decription of the protocol
In this subsection we present a step-by-step descrip-
tion of a proposed QKD protocol based on the quantum
Monty Hall (QMH) game devised by Flitney and Abbott
[31]. Just as in QMH, the protocol considers two parties:
Alice and Bob.
1. Alice generates the state
|ψi〉 = |0〉 ⊗ 1√
3
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉) (8)
as the initial state of the game.
3It is worth mentioning the importance of |ψi〉 as the
initial state, particularly of the GHZ state [36] in which
the first two qutrits are prepared. As noted by Benjamin
and Hayden in [23], the GHZ state has a useful property
in quantum game theory, that is(
Uˆ∗ ⊗ Uˆ
) 1√
3
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉)
=
1√
3
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉) , (9)
where, in this case, Uˆ ∈ SU(3) and Uˆ∗ stands for its
complex conjugate. In the quantum game theory con-
text, this property can be regarded as the existence of a
counter-strategy Uˆ∗ for the initially applied strategy Uˆ .
Alice now needs to “hide the prize”. This is repre-
sented in the following step.
2. Alice generates a random n-tuple of bits ka (n will
be the length of the raw key) and applies one of
the following two operators depending on the bit in
turn:
Gˆ0 =

0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
 if the bit is 0, (10)
Gˆ1 =

0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
 if the bit is 1. (11)
Notice that Gˆ0 and Gˆ1 act on the basis states
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉} as the sum and subtraction of 1 (mod 3)
respectively.
3. Alice sends the second qutrit to Bob through a quan-
tum channel.
Step 3 is one with a possible vulnerability, as Eve may
be spying on the channel. We will address this and other
security details of the protocol in the next subsections.
Bob now has to “choose a door”. This is represented
in the next step.
4. Bob generates a random n-tuple of bits kb (n will
be the length of the raw key) and applies Gˆ0 or Gˆ1
depending on the bit in turn.
The following step is also one with a possible vulnera-
bility due to the presence of Eve.
5. Bob sends back his qutrit to Alice through a quan-
tum channel.
To this phase of the protocol, both Alice and Bob have
applied their strategies, and now Alice has the entire sys-
tem in possession, meaning that every following opera-
tions will be performed by her.
Following QMH, Alice now has to “open an empty
door”, which is attained by applying the empty-door-
opening operator (3).
6. Alice applies Oˆ to the full state of the system.
Bob now has to “choose” if he wishes to switch between
doors or stay with his initial choice. In the QMH context,
this corresponds to “choose” between applying the door-
switching operator (4) (γ = 0) and applying an identity
operator (γ = pi2 ).
7. Bob generates a random n-tuple of bits ks that en-
codes with 0 the case in which Alice will apply the
door-switching operator (4) and with 1 the case in
which she won’t. Bob makes ks public.
Step 7 may also be one with a possible vulnerability,
as Eve is supposed to know every public information.
8. Depending on the in-turn bit of ks, Alice applies the
door-switching operator (4) (bit 0) or does nothing
(bit 1).
For the purpose of this protocol, another operator is
needed. We define the victory-encoding operator:
Vˆ =
∑
ijk
|mjk〉 〈ijk| , (12)
where m = (i+ j + k) (mod 3). As its name suggests, Vˆ
encodes if Bob has win or not in the third qutrit. It is
worth mentioning that Vˆ only acts as a victory-encoding
operator for the states considered in this protocol, and
not for an arbitrary state |o b a〉.
9. Alice applies the victory-encoding operator (12).
To this stage of the protocol, the possible states in
which the game can be, are given by
|ψyx〉 = Vˆ
(
cos γ Sˆ + sin γ Iˆ27
)
Oˆ
(
Iˆ3 ⊗ Gˆy ⊗ Gˆx
)
|ψi〉 ,
(13)
where x, y ∈ {0, 1} represent the choice of Gˆ0 or Gˆ1 by
Alice and Bob, and γ ∈ {0, pi2} depending on the in-turn
bit of ks. For clarity in the final steps of the protocol, we
breakdown these states:
|ψ00〉 = |ψ11〉 = cos γ
[
1√
3
(|001〉+ |012〉+ |020〉)
]
+ sin γ
[
1√
3
(|100〉+ |111〉+ |122〉)
]
,
(14)
4|ψ01〉 = cos γ
[
1√
3
(|100〉+ |111〉+ |122〉)
]
+ sin γ
[
1√
3
(|001〉+ |012〉+ |020〉)
]
, (15)
|ψ10〉 = cos γ
[
1√
3
(|200〉+ |211〉+ |222〉)
]
+ sin γ
[
1√
3
(|002〉+ |010〉+ |021〉)
]
. (16)
Notice from these expressions that in all the cases
where the first two qutrits coincide (b = a), which cor-
responds to the cases in which Bob wins the game, the
third qutrit is different from |0〉; while in the cases where
the first two qutrits do not coincide (b 6= a), which cor-
responds to the cases in which Bob loses the game, the
third qutrit is |0〉.
10. Alice measures the third qutrit. If the result is |0〉,
it means b 6= a and thus Bob has lost. If the result
is either |1〉 or |2〉, it means b = a and thus Bob
has won.
Just as step 7, the next step may also represent a vul-
nerability due to the fact that Eve is supposed to know
every public information.
11. Alice encodes the result of the game in a bit: 0 if
Bob lost and 1 if Bob won. With many of these
bits from various games, Alice forms the n-tuple
kr, which she then makes public.
From the states in (14), (15) and (16), notice that the
cases in which Bob won by choosing not to switch be-
tween doors, were the ones where both Alice and Bob
had chosen the same strategy Gˆi. On the other hand,
the cases in which Bob won by choosing to switch be-
tween doors, were the ones where Alice and Bob had
chosen different strategies Gˆi.
12. Alice and Bob publicly compare ks and kr from
steps 7 and 11. If two bits in the same position
(corresponding to the same game) coincide between
ks and kr, they also will coincide between ka and
kb. While if two bits do not coincide between ks
and kr, they also won’t coincide between ka and kb.
In this last case Bob negates the corresponding bit
of kb. At the end of this process ka = kb.
This step allows Alice and Bob to use the n-tuples
ka and kb as the key after performing an information-
reconciliation process. There is one last step that has to
do with the security of the protocol, this will be described
along with its technical details in the next subsection.
B. Security of the protocol
In this subsection we describe the technical details in
which the security of the protocol is based. To avoid
introducing more notation, we will use ki to refer to either
the tuple or just one of the bits of that tuple.
The tenth step of the protocol states that Alice must
perform a measurement on the third qutrit in order for
her to know if Bob has won or lost. With this measure-
ment, the three-qutrit states in equations (14), (15) and
(16) will collapse into a two-qutrit subspace. After the
measurement, the new state of the system depends on
whether Alice and Bob applied the same strategy or not.
However, as we will show next, just from the publicly
available information (ks and kr) and her own knowl-
edge (ka), Alice can know for sure which state remains
after the measurement.
• In the cases where {ka = 0, ks = 0, kr = 1} or
{ka = 0, ks = 1, kr = 1} or {ka = 1, ks = 0, kr = 1}
or {ka = 1, ks = 1, kr = 1}, the state of the system
after the measurement is given by
|φ0〉 = 1√
3
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉) . (17)
• In the cases where {ka = 0, ks = 0, kr = 0}
or {ka = 1, ks = 1, kr = 0} or
{ka = 1, ks = 0, kr = 0}, the state of the sys-
tem after the measurement is given by
|φ1〉 = 1√
3
(|01〉+ |12〉+ |20〉) . (18)
• In the case where {ka = 0, ks = 1, kr = 0}, the state
of the system after the measurement is given by
|φ2〉 = 1√
3
(|02〉+ |10〉+ |21〉) . (19)
Notice that |φ0〉, |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are all entangled states.
In fact |φ0〉 is the GHZ state for two three-dimensional
parties, while both |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 are equivalent to |φ0〉
in the sense that both can be obtained from it via local
operations. This is an important feature, as these states
strongly (almost maximally) violate a Bell-type inequal-
ity for two qutrits [13, 14, 17].
For two three-dimensional systems, every local hidden-
variable (LHV) theory or classically correlated system
must satisfy the following inequality [13, 14, 17]:
I3 =P (A1 = B1) + P (A2 ⊕ 1 = B1)
+ P (A2 = B2) + P (A1 = B2)
− P (A1 ⊕ 1 = B1)− P (A2 = B1)
− P (A2 ⊕ 1 = B2)− P (A1 = B2 ⊕ 1) ≤ 2, (20)
where ⊕ is the sum (mod 3) and Ai, Bi ∈ {0, 1, 2} de-
note the three possible outcomes of two different mea-
surements (i ∈ {1, 2}) made in systems A and B respec-
tively.
5Notice that, quantum-mechanically, the value of I3 in
(20) depends on the specific measurements the parties
perform, as well as on the state in which the system is. As
it is usual when working with Bell-type inequalities, we
calculate the value of I3 taking the expectation value of
a Bell operator B with respect to the state of the system
[14, 17], i.e. I3 = 〈B〉.
The Bell operators which maximally violate the in-
equality (20) for the states |φ0〉, |φ1〉 and |φ2〉, are re-
spectively:
B0 =

0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2√
3
0
2√
3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 2√
3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 0

, (21)
B1 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 2√
3
2 0 0
0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 2√
3
0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0
0 2 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 0

, (22)
B2 =

0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 2 0
0 0 2√
3
0 0 0 0 2√
3
0
2√
3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 2√
3
0 0 0
0 0 2 2√
3
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

. (23)
The three of them yield a value of I3 =
4
9
(
3 + 2
√
3
) ≈
2.873.
It is worth mentioning that the ratio of violation for
this inequality, defined in general as
r =
〈B〉QM
〈B〉LHV
, (24)
using the Bell operators B0, B1 and B2 with the states
|φ0〉, |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 respectively, is r = 2.8732 ≈ 1.435;
higher than the ratio of violation in the E91 protocol
(r =
√
2 ≈ 1.414), which is the one given by the CHSH
inequality violation [11].
We are now in a position to describe the last step of
the protocol.
13. Alice measures the states |φj〉 and calculates the
expectation value of the corresponding Bell operator
Bj in each case. If 〈Bj〉 ≥ χ, where χ > 2 is a
previously agreed lower bound for I3 between Alice
and Bob, they conclude there was no interference
in their communications and thus the key is safe.
C. Eve’s attack
In this subsection we describe how the presence of an
spy (Eve) in the communications between Alice and Bob,
might alter the results of the protocol proposed in sub-
section IV A. We suppose that every measurement per-
formed by Eve is a projective measurement.
We assert that there is no vulnerability in the pub-
licly available information by itself, namely ks and kr; of
course this is only the case when Eve just knows ks and
kr. This assertion can be easily proved by checking all
possible combinations of values between ks and kr, and
noticing that in all of them, the applied strategies, which
are the ones that encode the key, can not be unambigu-
ously determined:
• If ks = kr = 0, then the possible values for ka and
kb are {ka = 0, kb = 0} or {ka = 1, kb = 1}.
• If ks = 0, kr = 1, then the possible values for ka
and kb are {ka = 0, kb = 1} or {ka = 1, kb = 0}.
• If ks = 1, kr = 0, then the possible values for ka
and kb are {ka = 0, kb = 1} or {ka = 1, kb = 0}.
• If ks = kr = 1, then the possible values for ka and
kb are {ka = 0, kb = 0} or {ka = 1, kb = 1}.
However, as it can be seen from these cases, if Eve hap-
pens to know which strategy was applied by either Alice
or Bob without them noticing, the whole protocol falls
down.
The first and third qutrits are always in Alice’s pos-
session, meaning that Eve can not infer anything about
Alice’s applied strategy. However, the second qutrit, in
which Bob applies his strategy, is sent through a quan-
tum channel twice, meaning that Eve has two chances to
hack the protocol.
The first possible case is that Eve intercepts and mea-
sures Bob’s qutrit the first time it is sent (step 3 of the
protocol), but not the second one. In this case, as Bob
has not yet applied his strategy, there is no useful infor-
mation Eve could retrieve from her measurement, getting
only a qutrit in the state |0〉, |1〉 or |2〉 with a probability
of 1/3 each.
The second possible case is that Eve intercepts and
measures Bob’s qutrit the second time it is sent (step 5
of the protocol), but not the first one. This case might
seem different from the last one, as this time Bob has
6already applied his strategy. However, due to the form
of |ψi〉 in (8), Eve would again only be getting a qutrit
in the state |0〉, |1〉 or |2〉 with a probability of 1/3 each.
It is clear that in order for Eve to have a chance of
knowing which strategy Bob will apply, she has to inter-
cept the second qutrit both the first and the second time
it is sent. The fist one to project the qutrit in an specific
and arbitrary state known by her, and the second one to
retrieve the information regarding the strategy applied
by Bob; this kind of attack is known as an Intercept and
Resend or IR attack . The restriction of Eve having to
perform two measurements in order to gain information
from the system may be exploited to increase the security
of the protocol, by using two different one-way quantum
channels for example, a feature that could also protect it
from more general attacks.
We have shown that in this paradigm of projective
measurements, the only possible option for Eve is to per-
form two different IR attacks, possibly in two different
quantum channels. We next describe in detail what hap-
pens if she does.
As mentioned in the previous subsection IV B, the only
possible states that can remain after Alice’s measurement
of the third qutrit are |φ0〉, |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 (17) (18) (19).
In each case, if Eve decided to apply a 2-IR attack every
time Alice and Bob implemented the protocol, the possi-
ble states that remain after Alice’s last measurement are
respectively
%ˆ0 =
1
3
(|00〉 〈00|+ |11〉 〈11|+ |22〉 〈22|) , (25)
%ˆ1 =
1
3
(|01〉 〈01|+ |12〉 〈12|+ |20〉 〈20|) , (26)
%ˆ2 =
1
3
(|02〉 〈02|+ |10〉 〈10|+ |21〉 〈21|) , (27)
which can be shown to yield a value of I3 = Tr {%ˆjBj} = 0
for all j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. This result, based on what was ex-
posed in the previous subsection IV B, allows Alice and
Bob to infer that Eve has interfered in their communica-
tions.
Eve knows that if she attacks the channel every time
Alice and Bob implement the protocol, she is going to
be detected. So she decides to carry out the 2-IR attack
based on the occurrence of an event with probability p,
i.e. Eve’s attack will be executed with probability p each
time the protocol is implemented. Under these circum-
stances, the possible states that remain in each case after
Alice’s last measurement are
ρˆ0 = (1− p) |φ0〉 〈φ0|+ p %ˆ0, (28)
ρˆ1 = (1− p) |φ1〉 〈φ1|+ p %ˆ1, (29)
ρˆ2 = (1− p) |φ2〉 〈φ2|+ p %ˆ2. (30)
In this case I3 is a function of p, the dependence is the
same for all ρˆj and its plot is shown in Figure 1.
Defining pQ as the value of p in which I3 = 2, from
Figure 1 we found that if p < pQ, the inequality (20) can
still be violated. The value of pQ is pQ = 11/2− 3
√
3 ≈
FIG. 1: Dependence of the Bell parameter I3 with the
probability p of Eve performing two IR attacks.
0.304, meaning that Eve can have approximately 30%
of the raw key if Alice and Bob decided that their only
criterion to consider the key as safe was the inequality
violation. However, as stated in step 13 of the protocol,
Alice and Bob could have previously agreed on a lower
bound for I3, reducing Eve’s information on the key as
much as they want.
It is worth mentioning the effect that the presence of
noise in the quantum channel has in the value of I3. As it
is shown in [14], the presence of noise in the channel can
be modeled in a similar fashion as the presence of Eve
(28) (29) (30), meaning that in this case, some amount
of noise in the channel plays against Eve, as even if she
chooses a relatively small value of p, the presence of noise
would amplify it, making it easier for Alice and Bob to
detect her.
V. QKD PROTOCOL USING QUBITS
In order to motivate and simplify a possible physi-
cal implementation of the QKD protocol described in
the previous section IV A, which we will refer to as the
Quanty-Hall protocol, in this section we adequate its for-
malism to use qubits instead of qutrits, and simple quan-
tum gates instead of unitary three-dimensional operators.
A. Decription of the protocol
In this subsection we present a step-by-step descrip-
tion of the Quanty-Hall protocol, using qubits and simple
quantum gates for its implementation. The translation
is made by associating one qutrit with two qubits as:
|0〉 −→ |00〉 ,
|1〉 −→ |01〉 ,
|2〉 −→ |10〉 , (31)
and ignoring the two-qubits state |11〉. With this associa-
tion in mind, seems natural to think that we need just six
7qubits to model the system used in the Quanty-Hall pro-
tocol. However, due to the nature of the door-switching
operator Sˆ (4), which based on the values of b and o se-
lects a different value of b, we need to add two ancillary
qubits that will serve as control qubits for its applica-
tion. It is worth mentioning that, despite the fact that
the empty-door-opening operator Oˆ (3) has this same be-
havior, it is not necessary to add ancillary qubits for it;
this is due to the fact that the value of qutrit o is initial-
ized in o = 0, and it remains with that value until the
application of Oˆ.
Unlike the qutrit-Quanty-Hall protocol, in this case we
will suppose that the initial state of the system is with
all eight needed qubits in zero, i.e.
|ψbi〉 = |00〉︸︷︷︸
Bns
⊗ |00〉︸︷︷︸
O
⊗ |00〉︸︷︷︸
Bs
⊗ |00〉︸︷︷︸
A
, (32)
where the first two qubits (A) correspond to Alice’s
choice of strategy, the third and fourth qubits (Bs) cor-
respond to Bob’s choice of strategy and are the ones on
which the door-switching operator will act, the fifth and
sixth qubits (O) are the ones on which the information
regarding the empty-door opening will be stored, and the
seventh and eighth qubits (Bns) are the ancillary qubits
needed to control the door-switching operator. Qubits
(Bns) correspond to the state of Bob’s qutrit in the case
where he does not apply the door-switching operator,
while qubits (Bs) correspond to the state of Bob’s qutrit
in the case where he does apply the door-switching op-
erator. Due to the fact that in this case we have four
qubits corresponding to Bob, and in order to avoid send-
ing through a quantum channel redundant information,
in this qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol, Bob is going to be
the one performing most of the operations, while Alice
will just apply its own strategy.
The first step of the protocol describes the operations
that Bob must perform on the initial state (32) in order to
analogously initialize the system as in the qutrit-Quanty-
Hall protocol (8).
1. Bob applies the INIT operator (see Figure 2) to the
initial state |ψbi〉.
Where H in Figure 2 represents the Hadamard gate and
U3 is the gate defined as
U3 =
 cos ( θ2) −eiλ sin ( θ2)
eiφ sin
(
θ
2
)
eiλ+iφ cos
(
θ
2
)
∣∣∣∣∣θ=2 arctan
(
1√
2
)
φ=0
λ=pi.
(33)
The second step describes the application of Bob’s
strategy to his corresponding qubits.
2. Bob generates a random n-tuple of bits kb (n will
be the length of the raw key) and depending on the
in-turn bit of kb, applies Gˆb0 or Gˆb1 (see Figures 3
and 4) to both pair of qubits, Bs and Bns, belonging
to him.
FIG. 2: Quantum Circuit of the INIT operator. It
initialize the system in the state
1√
3
(|00000000〉+ |01000101〉+ |10001010〉).
where X in Figures 3 and 4 represent the Not gate.
For Alice to be able to apply her strategy, Bob must
send her the corresponding pair of qubits.
3. Bob sends the pair of qubits A to Alice through a
quantum channel each.
With the pair of qubits A in her possession, Alice now
applies her strategy.
4. Alice generates a random n-tuple of bits ka (n will
be the length of the raw key) and depending on the
in-turn bit of ka, applies Gˆb0 or Gˆb1 (see Figures 3
and 4) to her pair of qubits.
In order for Bob to apply the remaining operations,
Alice must return her pair of qubits to Bob.
5. Alice sends back the pair of qubits A to Bob through
a quantum channel each.
Now that Bob is in possession of all the state, he will
be the one performing the remaining operations.
6. Bob applies Oˆb (see Figure 5) to the first six qubits
(A, Bs and O).
FIG. 3: Quantum Circuit of the operator Gˆb0.
FIG. 4: Quantum Circuit of the operator Gˆb1.
8FIG. 5: Quantum Circuit of the operator Oˆb
Notice that, since Bob’s qubits are only for controlling
the operations performed on O, there is no need to in-
clude the pair of qubits Bns, as to this point, they carry
the same information as the pair of qubits Bs.
It is worth mentioning that the qubit operator Oˆb only
acts as the qutrit operator Oˆ for the states that appear in
the protocol, and not for an arbitrary state |o b a〉 trans-
lated to qubits by the association in (31).
Unlike the qutrit-Quanty-Hall protocol, this time is
Bob the one that will apply the switching operator, and
will do it to the corresponding qubits no matter what.
7. Bob applies Sˆb (see Figure 6) to the last six qubits
(Bs, O and Bns).
As in the qutrit-Quanty-Hall protocol, we need again
a victory-encoding operator.
8. Bob applies Vˆb (see Figure 7) to the first six qubits
(A, Bs and O).
We break down again all the possible states in which
the system can be to this point of the qubit-Quanty-Hall
protocol:
|ψb00〉 = |ψb11〉 =
O︷︸︸︷
|00〉 ⊗
1√
3
(|001000〉+ |010001〉+ |100110〉) ,
(34)
FIG. 6: Quantum Circuit of the operator Sˆb
FIG. 7: Quantum Circuit of the operator Vˆb.
|ψb01〉 =
O︷︸︸︷
|01〉 ⊗
1√
3
(|000101〉+ |011010〉+ |100000〉) , (35)
|ψb10〉 =
O︷︸︸︷
|10〉 ⊗
1√
3
(|001010〉+ |010000〉+ |100101〉) , (36)
where, for simplicity, we have rearranged the pairs of
qubits from |Bns, O, Bs, A〉 to |O, Bns, Bs, A〉.
Notice from these expressions that the cases in which
the results of the measurements of qubits O are 00, are
the ones in which Alice and Bob had chosen the same
strategy Gˆbi; while the cases in which the results of the
measurements of qubitsO are either 01 or 10, are the ones
in which Alice and Bob had chosen different strategies
Gˆbi.
9. Bob measures the pair of qubits O. If the results
are 00, the corresponding bits between ka and kb
will coincide. If the results are either 01 or 10,
the corresponding bits between ka and kb will not
coincide. In this last case Bob applies a bit flip. At
the end of this process ka = kb.
Analogously as in the qutrit case, this step allows Alice
and Bob to use the n-tuples ka and kb as the key after
performing an information-reconciliation process. Once
again, there is one last step regarding the security of the
protocol, this will be described along with its technical
details in the next subsection. Figure 8 shows the quan-
tum circuit of the complete qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol.
B. Security of the protocol
In this subsection we describe the technical details in
which the security of the qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol is
based. To avoid introducing more notation, we will use O
9FIG. 8: Quantum Circuit of the qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol.
to refer to either the pair of qubits or its measurements’
results.
Notice that just from the result of the measurements
of qubits O, Bob can know for sure to which state the
system collapses after the measurement.
• In the case where O = 00, the state that remains
after the measurements is
|φb0〉 = 1√
3
(|001000〉+ |010001〉+ |100110〉) . (37)
• In the case where O = 01, the state that remains
after the measurements is
|φb1〉 = 1√
3
(|000101〉+ |011010〉+ |100000〉) . (38)
• In the case where O = 10, the state that remains
after the measurements is
|φb2〉 = 1√
3
(|001010〉+ |010000〉+ |100101〉) . (39)
Notice that |φb0〉, |φb1〉 and |φb2〉 are all entangled
states, as there is no single independent qubit. These
particular states are not almost maximally entangled as
a GHZ state, however they also strongly violate a Bell-
type inequality for six qubits [12].
For n two-dimensional systems, every local hidden-
variable (LHV) theory or classically correlated system
must satisfy the following recursively defined inequality
[12]:
|Fn| =
∣∣∣∣12 (an + a′n)Fn−1 + 12 (an − a′n)F ′n−1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2,
(40)
where an = ±1 and a′n = ±1 denote the two possible
outcomes of two measurements on the n-th qubit, while
F ′j represents the same expression as Fj with all a
′
j and
aj interchanged.
For the specific case of n = 6, notice that the value
of F6 in (40) depends on the specific measurements per-
formed in each of the six qubits, as well as on the state
in which the system is. As it is usual when working with
Bell-type inequalities, we calculate the value of F6 taking
the expectation value of a Bell operator Bb with respect
to the state of the system [12], i.e. F6 = 〈Bb〉.
The respective Bell operators which maximally violate
the inequality (40) for the states |φb0〉, |φb1〉 and |φb2〉,
are found to be:
Bb0 = 8 |101110〉 〈011001|+ 8 |011001〉 〈101110|
− 8 |100110〉 〈010001| − 8 |010001〉 〈100110| , (41)
Bb1 = 8 |011010〉 〈000101|+ 8 |000101〉 〈011010|
− 8 |111010〉 〈100101| − 8 |100101〉 〈111010| , (42)
Bb2 = 8 |110101〉 〈011010|+ 8 |011010〉 〈110101|
− 8 |100101〉 〈001010| − 8 |001010〉 〈100101| . (43)
The three of them yield a value of |F6| = 16/3 ≈ 5.333.
In this case, the ratio of violation for inequality (40),
using the Bell operators Bb0, Bb1 and Bb2 with the states
|φb0〉, |φb1〉 and |φb2〉 respectively, is r = 5.333/2 ≈ 2.666;
higher than the ratio of violation of the qutrit-Quanty-
Hall protocol and hence higher than the E91 protocol.
We are now in a position to describe the last step of
the qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol.
10. Bob measures the states |φbj〉 and calculates the ex-
pectation value of the corresponding Bell operator
10
Bbj in each case. If 〈Bbj〉 ≥ χ, where χ > 2 is a
previously agreed lower bound for |F6| between Alice
and Bob, they conclude there was no interference in
their communications and thus that the key is safe.
C. Eve’s attack
In this subsection we describe how the presence of an
spy (Eve) in the communications between Alice and Bob,
might alter the results of the protocol proposed in subsec-
tion V A. We suppose that every measurement performed
by Eve is a projective measurement.
Unlike the qutrit-Quanty-Hall protocol, in the qubit-
Quanty-Hall protocol there is no publicly available in-
formation. This means that the only possible points of
vulnerability are when Bob sends the pair of qubits A to
Alice and when she sends them back to Bob.
The first possible case is that Eve intercepts and mea-
sures Alice’s pair of qubits the first time they are sent
(step 3 of the protocol), but not the second one. In this
case, as Alice has not yet applied her strategy, there is
no useful information Eve could retrieve from her mea-
surement, getting only two qubits in the state |00〉, |01〉
or |10〉 with a probability of 1/3 each.
The second possible case is that Eve intercepts and
measures Alice’s pair of qubits the second time it is sent
(step 5 of the protocol), but not the first one. Once again,
due to the form of the state after the application of the
INIT operator (see figure 2), Eve would again only be
getting two qubits in the state |00〉, |01〉 or |10〉 with a
probability of 1/3 each.
Just as in the qutrit-Quanty-Hall protocol, in order for
Eve to have a chance of knowing which strategy Alice will
apply, she has to, once again, perform two IR attacks:
the first one when Bob sends the qubits to Alice and the
second one when Alice sends back the qubits to Bob.
We have shown that in this paradigm of projective
measurements, the only possible option for Eve is to per-
form two different IR attacks in possibly two qubits each
time. We next describe the possible consequences of this
action.
First notice that, if Eve measures the two qubits in
pair A, either the first time they are sent, the second one
or both, the system will collapse to a classical (not in a
superposition) state, and the analysis to be made is ex-
actly the same as in subsection IV C. In each case, if Eve
decided to perform this attack every time Alice and Bob
implemented the protocol, then the possible states that
remain after Bob’s last measurement are respectively
%ˆb0 =
1
3
(|001000〉 〈001000|+
|010001〉 〈010001|+ |100110〉 〈100110|) , (44)
%ˆb1 =
1
3
(|000101〉 〈000101|+
|011010〉 〈011010|+ |100000〉 〈100000|) , (45)
FIG. 9: Dependence of the absolute value of the Bell
parameter F6 with the probability p of Eve performing
two IR attacks.
%ˆb2 =
1
3
(|001010〉 〈001010|+
|010000〉 〈010000|+ |100101〉 〈100101|) , (46)
which can be shown to yield a value of |F6| =
Tr {%ˆbjBbj} = 0 for all j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. This result, based on
what was exposed in the previous subsection V B, allows
Alice and Bob to infer that Eve has interfered in their
communications.
If now Eve decides to perform this attack based on
the occurrence of an event with probability p, i.e. Eve’s
attack will be executed with probability p each time the
protocol is implemented, then the possible states that
remain in each case after Bob’s last measurement are
ρˆ0 = (1− p) |φb0〉 〈φb0|+ p %ˆb0, (47)
ρˆ1 = (1− p) |φb1〉 〈φb1|+ p %ˆb1, (48)
ρˆ2 = (1− p) |φb2〉 〈φb2|+ p %ˆb2. (49)
In this case |F6| is a function of p, the dependence is the
same for all ρˆbj and its plot is shown in Figure 9.
Defining pbQ as the value of p in which |F6| = 2, from
Figure 9 we found that if p < pbQ, the inequality (40)
can still be violated. The value of pbQ is pbQ = 0.625,
meaning that Eve can have 62.5% of the raw key if Alice
and Bob decided that their only criterion to consider the
key as safe was the inequality violation. However, as
stated in step 10 of the qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol, Alice
and Bob could have previously agreed on a lower bound
for |F6|, reducing Eve’s information on the key as much
as they want.
A seemingly more interesting strategy for Eve to carry
out is measuring just one qubit of pair A. In this case,
if Eve measures the first qubit (A0) of the pair, both the
first and the second time the qubits are sent, we fall again
in the same case we have already analyzed, as the state
collapses to a classical state. The same happens if Eve
decides to measure the second qubit (A1) the two times
the pair is sent. The only cases in which the state is not
collapsed to a classical state are
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• Alice applied Gˆb0, Bob applied Gˆb0, Eve first mea-
sured A0 and obtained A0 = 0, Eve then measured
A1 and obtained A1 = 0. In this case the final
state of the system is
|λ00〉 = 1√
2
(|001000〉+ |010001〉) . (50)
• Alice applied Gˆb1, Bob applied Gˆb0, Eve first mea-
sured A1 and obtained A1 = 0, Eve then measured
A0 and obtained A0 = 0. Accordingly, the final
state is given by
|λ01〉 = 1√
2
(|011010〉+ |100000〉) . (51)
• Alice applied Gˆb0, Bob applied Gˆb1, Eve first mea-
sured A0 and obtained A0 = 0, Eve then measured
A1 and obtained A1 = 0. Here, the final state is
|λ10〉 = 1√
2
(|010000〉+ |100101〉) . (52)
• Alice applied Gˆb1, Bob applied Gˆb1, Eve first mea-
sured A1 and obtained A1 = 0, Eve then measured
A0 and obtained A0 = 0. In this last case the final
state is
|λ11〉 = 1√
2
(|001000〉+ |100110〉) . (53)
However, even though the states |λij〉 are not fully sep-
arable, they all yield a value of |F6| = 0 for the corre-
sponding Bell operators, and thus this case falls again in
the already analyzed one.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This work shows a possible application of quantum
game theory to the area of quantum information, in par-
ticular to quantum cryptography. We have proposed two
QKD protocols based on the quantum version of the
Monty Hall game devised by Flitney and Abbott [31].
The first proposed protocol, which we referred to as the
qutrit-Quanty-Hall protocol, is more directly motivated
by the game, using qutrits to describe the state of the
system and the same operators as in [31]. The moti-
vation behind the second proposed protocol, the qubit-
Quanty-Hall, was to simplify a possible physical imple-
mentation by adapting the formalism of the qutrit pro-
tocol to use qubits and simple logical quantum gates.
However, in doing this adaptation, a slightly different
protocol emerge. The main differences between the two
are that the qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol does not require
publicly available information to be communicated be-
tween the parties, while the qutrit one does; but it does
need the exchange of two particles instead of just the one
needed by the qutrit protocol.
The security of both Quanty-Hall protocols relies on
the non-classical correlations that arise between quan-
tum entangled systems, just as the E91 protocol. We
tested the strength of these correlations via the violation
of Bell-type inequalities for two qutrits in the case of the
qutrit protocol, and for six qubits in the case of the qubit
protocol. The results showed that both the qutrit and the
qubit protocol have a higher ratio of violation than E91,
meaning that the proposed protocols have a wider mar-
gin in which the distributed key can be considered safe
to use.
We have also analyzed a possible random intercept-
and-resend (IR) attack by Eve. The results showed that,
if Alice and Bob have previously agreed on a lower bound
for the violation of the corresponding inequality, then
they are able to arbitrarily reduce Eve’s information on
the key. Furthermore, we also showed that the presence
of noise in the quantum channel plays against Eve, as
noise by itself reduces the ratio of violation of the in-
equalities.
In conclusion, both proposed protocols are better
entanglement-based options than the E91 protocol. The
qubit-Quanty-Hall protocol in particular, is highly im-
plementable, needing in principle just eight qubits and
two quantum channels to work, and without the need of
public information to be communicated.
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